Biological warfare in a historical perspective  by Roffey, R. et al.
REVIEW
Biological warfare in a historical perspective
R. Roffey1, A. Tegnell2 and F. Elgh1,2,3
1Swedish Defense Research Agency, Division of NBC-Defense, Umea˚, 2Center for Microbiological
Preparedness, Swedish Institute for Infectious Disease Control (SMI), Solna and 3Department of
Virology, Umea˚ University, Umea˚, Sweden
There are some early examples of biological warfare (BW), but in modern times it was
used first for sabotage by Germany during WWI. Development of biological weapons on
a military significant scale was initiated in several countries in the period between the
world wars. During WWII, several countries had active programs such as the USA, UK,
Canada, Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union. It was only Japan that on a fairly large
scale used BW. The US program continued until 1969, when President Nixon took a
decision to end it in connection with signing the BTWC. The Soviet Union had also
continued its program after the war, and this was enhanced after signing the BTWC: in
the 1980s the program consisted of around fifty facilities and involved around 60 000
people. The Soviet Union produced and maintained a large stockpile of BW-agents. After
the collapse of the Soviet Union, and due to pressure from USA and UK, President Yeltsin
issued a decree in 1992 banning continued offensive BW activity. However, there are still
concerns of residual activity in Russia. Another program of concern is the Iraqi
BW-program. After 10 years of UN inspections that were stopped in 1998, there are
still many unanswered questions concerning the BW program. There was also a covert
BW-program in South Africa that was terminated aroud 1993. There have also been a
number of allegations of alleged use or possession. In addition, there are indications that
10–12 states are now trying to acquire BW, and this assessment is based on intelligence
information, mainly from the USA. For example Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Sudan and
Libya. Another aspect is the strong driving force of technology developments to promote
this type of program, opening new risks for future potential military misuse.
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B I O L O G I C A L W A R F A R E B E F O R E
T H E 2 0 T H C E N T U R Y
War and infectious diseases have always been
closely linked. Even without a precise understand-
ing of how diseases were spread, it was under-
stood early on that dead animals or humans could
cause disease. There are some accounts of biolo-
gical warfare as early as Greek and Roman times,
but these are difficult to confirm and analyze. For
an overview and further example of biological war-
fare prior to the 20th century, please see the paper
in this issue entitled ‘Biological weapons and bio-
terrorism preparedness: importance of public-
health awareness and international cooperation’.
M O D E R N B I O L O G I C A L W A R F A R E
During World War I, Germany used biological
warfare (BW) agents for sabotage. Horses being
shipped to the Allies were infected with anthrax or
glanders. This kind of sabotage was carried out in
the USA, Romania, France and Spain, and later in
Argentina and Norway. These actions did not
have military consequences. France also seems
to have had similar interests prior to World War
II, but never got beyond research. Germany also
undertook some limited activity prior to World
War II, but most of the documentation was
destroyed when Germany was invaded [1,2].
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During World War II, many countries tried to
acquire a BW capability. Among them were the
USA, Russia, the UK, Canada, France, Italy, Ger-
many, Japan, and Hungary [2]. The UK and Cana-
dian BW programs were started in the 1930s. Both
programs focused on agents harmful to crops and
animals. In 1941, the UK had developed anthrax as
an agent against cattle. Canada did extensive work
on rinderpest. The USA–UK–Canadian BW pro-
gram was focused on anthrax as an antipersonnel
weapon. It was abandoned before being finished
[2]. The UK BW program was aimed at retaliation-
in-kind, using agents against cattle, in the form of
cattle-cakes containing anthrax organisms. The UK
produced 5 million cattle-cakes containing anthrax
organisms, but these were never used. Testing of
bombs was carried out on the island of Gruinard
off the Scottish coast during 1942. Plans between
the UK, Canada and the USA for a joint BW cluster
bomb never reached the production stage during
the war. Some studies were carried out on botulin,
and a small amount of work was done on plague
and Salmonella [1]. Field tests were carried out on
BW munitions. Research focused on anthrax, botu-
lin, and vectors to spread disease.
In reality, German activity was limited, as no
offensive work was permitted [3]. Contacts
between the Axis powers with regard to BW
agents were very limited. By contrast, the Japanese
BW program, which had been initiated in the
middle of the 1930s, became quite advanced dur-
ing World War II, and production capabilities
(hundreds of kilograms) were developed for pla-
gue, anthrax, typhoid, cholera and dysentery. Sev-
eral different types of bombs and devices to
disseminate agents were developed, as well as
methods for sabotage. Agents were tested on pris-
oners of war and, on a fairly large scale, against
Chinese populations. Not all information concern-
ing the Japanese BW program and activities has
yet been made public [1].
T H E U S B I O L O G I C A L W A R F A R E
P R O G R A M
The US BW program was initiated as a response to
suspicions during World War II that Germany and
Japan were developing such warfare capabilities.
George W. Merck was a key member of the panel
advising President Franklin Roosevelt and was
also responsible for initiating the program. The
Army Chemical Warfare Service was given the
responsibility for the program. The BW research
was initiated in 1941 under stringent security, and
the public was given no information until after the
war, in 1946. Secretary of War H. Stimson had
referred to the fact that Germany had used glan-
ders against Rumanian cavalry, and that German
saboteurs had infected horses being shipped to
Europe, in World War I. Merck soon realized that
the initial phase of work, using universities and
private research institutes, was inadequate, and
that a large-scale effort was required to develop
weapons and means of protection.
In 1943, work on BW agents started at Fort
Detrick, Maryland. The US BW program was given
high priority. Germany is said to have had a mortal
fear of the US BW capability, and decided against
the BW option, a fact that the Allies were not aware
of [4]. The important technological achievement in
the US program during World War II was the
development of small-particle-size aerosol disse-
mination of wet or dry preparations of pathogens.
The US dropped charges of war crimes against the
leading members of the Japanese BW program in
exchange for data on experiments on human sub-
jects [2]. In preparation for the Korean War, wheat
rust was made available in 1950 as an agent to be
used against the Soviet Union. The first production
facility for bacterial agents was opened in the Pine
Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, and production of Bru-
cella suis began in 1954, eventually reaching an
output of 650 tons/month [2]. During the 1950s
and 1960s, the program was further expanded, and
more facilities were involved. At its peak, the pro-
gram involved about 3400 people and a number of
agents: Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Bru-
cella suis, Coxiella burnetti, Venezuelan equine ence-
phalitis (VEE) virus, yellow fever, botulin,
staphylococcal enterotoxin, and the anti-crop
agents Pyricularia oryzae and Puccinia graminis [2].
In 1969, President Nixon took a historic decision
to stop further offensive BW development, and to
use the facilities for peaceful purposes or for bio-
defense work only. There were several reasons for
this, one being that the USA did not want to further
develop the technology for BW, as there was a risk
that other countries would also acquire it. Offi-
cially, it was stated that BW agents were of limited
use. Another important reason was to make pro-
gress in negotiations to establish a convention
banning biological and toxin weapons. In the after-
math, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation
actively spread disinformation to the Soviet Union
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to the effect that a covert offensive BW program
was continuing in the USA [2].
It has recently been shown that the allegations
during the Korean War by China, North Korea and
the Soviet Union that the USA had used BW agents
were based on fabricated and false evidence. At
the time, this claim was taken most seriously and
generated much international attention [2].
Another case of allegations that could never be
proven was when Cuba accused the USA on sev-
eral occasions of using BW agents. The latest was
in 1997, when Cuba accused the USA of spreading
Trips palmi, which led to consultations in Geneva
under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Conven-
tion [2].
T H E S O V I E T / R U S S I A N B I O L O G I C A L
W A R F A R E P R O G R A M
In September 1981, the US Secretary of State
accused the Soviet Union of supplying mycotoxins
to its Vietnamese and Laotian communist allies for
military use against resistance forces in Laos and
Cambodia, and of using the same agents in combat
operations in Afghanistan [5]. If true, this was the
first time that toxins were used in warfare. The
USA also implied that the Soviet Union was then
violating the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. This
allegation and the presented evidence led to much
discussion. A group of researchers gave an alter-
native explanation for the so-called ‘yellow rain’.
They argued that mycotoxins are common in this
region and that the colored rain that refugees had
spoken of could well be harmless showers of
yellow feces released by swarming honeybees
[6]. To date, the USA has not retracted its claim
that the Soviet Union and its allies engaged in
toxin warfare in South East Asia from 1975 to
1984 [5]. This is also one reason why the USA still
insists on including trichothecene mycotoxins on
all lists of possible BW agents. The example of the
‘yellow rain’ confirms the importance in this type
of situation of employing scientifically trained
teams that can respond promptly to allegations,
gain access immediately and employ rigorous
forensic methods to preserve evidence, at the site
of alleged use.
The Soviet BW program was initiated in the
mid-1920s. During 1930–40, research was carried
out at the Red Army Bacteriology Institute in
Vlasikha, 40 km from Moscow, on gas gangrene,
tetanus, botulism and plague, and on methods for
warfare, including aircraft and artillery shells. Not
much is known of this early development, and
some of it was carried out by imprisoned scientists
[7]. The Stalinist purges of microbiologists
involved in the program limited the progress
made. During World War II, typhus was devel-
oped as a BW agent, and an aircraft dispenser for
plague bacteria was invented. The capture of Japa-
nese members of the BW program provided data
and plans for building BW facilities that were used
in the Soviet Union in 1946. The technology and
equipment for fermentation were captured in Ger-
many and brought back to the Soviet Union [2].
During the 1950s, a series of new BW research and
production facilities was constructed. At the time
of the Korean War, there was a belief that BW
agents might be used on a massive scale against
the Soviet Union by the USA. A system of anti-
plague institutes scattered over the country was
created; local laboratories and field epidemiologic
teams were connected to these, so that they could
rapidly investigate any outbreaks. Although the
Soviet Union signed and ratified the Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which
entered into force in 1975, it took a high-level
decision to massively enlarge the BW program;
the disinformation program on the part of the USA
might well have been an important factor in this.
To take advantage of the rapid progress in micro-
biology and biotechnology, a special secret orga-
nization, Biopreparat, was created to develop BW
technology and agents. The Ministries of Health
and Agriculture, KGB and the Academy of
Sciences were also involved. Biopreparat was offi-
cially an organization to develop new technologies
in biotechnology for commercial applications. At
this time, a decision was taken to establish eight
large ‘mobilization capacity’ BW production facil-
ities; these were tested for large-scale BW produc-
tion at short notice, but officially were declared
to be civilian biotechnology production plants.
Open-air field testing of BW agents was carried
out on the island of Vozrozhdeniye in the Aral sea.
At its height, the BW program as a whole involved
about 60 000 people in 40–50 facilities. The pro-
gram was surrounded by very high security, and
the West had very limited information until sev-
eral high-ranking members of the program def-
ected at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the
1990s. The Soviet Union produced BW agents on a
massive scale, and maintained a large stockpile.
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Among the agents were tons of plague, anthrax
and smallpox organisms to be used in interconti-
nental missiles. The Soviet BW program included
Tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis, plague, glanders,
Marburg virus, smallpox virus, and VEE virus. In
total, about 50 agents were available for study,
including aspects of genetic modification of them.
From 1989, there was a concerted effort by the
USA and UK to end the Soviet/Russian BW pro-
gram. A trilateral process with mutual inspections
was initiated. This stopped in 1994, and has not
been revived since then. In 1992, President Yeltsin
issued a decree to the effect that there had been a
delay in implementing the BTWC and that further
offensive work would now be banned [1,2,8]. Since
then, there has been limited progress in promoting
Russian transparency concerning its ongoing bio-
defense work, and the West suspects that the
offensive part of the program is ongoing in some
form [9]. The method that has now been adopted
by the West is to support Russia through financial
aid. The aim is to encourage scientists with BW
knowledge in Russia and CIS countries to redirect
their research toward peaceful purposes, and dis-
courage them from accepting proposals to work
for rogue states [10].
An incident of great importance was the Sver-
dlovsk outbreak of anthrax in 1979, in which 69
people died. At the time, the USA claimed that the
outbreak was the result of a release from a BW
production facility. This was also the first major
evidence that the Soviet Union was violating the
BTWC. The Soviet Union claimed that the out-
break was a result of contaminated meat sold on
the black market and that no international inves-
tigation was needed. This incident resulted in a
long-standing period of distrust concerning BW
between the USA and the Soviet Union. In 1992,
President Yeltsin acknowledged that there had
been an aerosol release from a military facility,
but he did not indicate what type of work was
being carried out. Recently, official representatives
of the military have returned to the old explana-
tion of contaminated meat. This shows the need for
a mechanism for international investigation of this
kind of incident [8].
T H E I R A Q I B I O L O G I C A L W A R F A R E
P R O G R A M
The Iraqi BW program was, as far as is known,
initiated in 1974 at Al Hazen. The agents studied
were Clostridium botulinum, spores of Bacillus, and
influenza virus. This program did not progress
very far, and those responsible were imprisoned,
for reasons that are not clear today. According to
the Iraqi information supplied to the United
Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the pro-
gram was restarted in 1979 under the leadership of
Dr Taha, who had a PhD in microbiology from the
UK. There is speculation, however, that she was
only presented to UNSCOM as a figurehead, and
that the real head of the program is still unknown.
The research at AL Muthanna was expanded
in 1986, to include aflatoxin, trichothecene myco-
toxins, and ricin. In 1990, the program was further
expanded to include viruses and the genetic
engineering of agents. It is estimated that around
30 agents were in some way studied for possible
use. According to Iraqi information, aflatoxin,
botulin and anthrax organisms were placed in
missiles and air-delivered bombs in preparation
for the Gulf War, but were not used. After 10 years
of surveillance, which was in 1998, there are
still many unanswered questions concerning
the BW program and the possibility of ongoing
activity.
B I O L O G I C A L W A R F A R E P R O G R A M S
T H R O U G H O U T T H E W O R L D
South Africa also had a BW program, which was
initiated in 1980 and terminated around 1993. This
was a limited covert program, in which Bacillus
anthracis, Vibrio cholerae and Clostridium species
were studied. Only small quantities of agents were
produced, and no large-scale weaponry. Anthrax
was used for individual assassinations, and cho-
lerae for contaminating water supplies during
attacks against freedom fighters in Namibia and,
perhaps, other areas [2].
There are indications that 10–12 states are pre-
sently trying to acquire BW capability; this estima-
tion is based on intelligence information, mainly
from the USA. The countries named are Iraq,
North Korea, Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Libya. This
claim has remained unchanged for many years,
but, so far, there is little evidence to support it.
D I S C U S S I O N
BW or bioterrorism may have similar aims, but the
magnitude of the effects might be different. From a
historical point of view, it can be noted that the
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early military BW programs were aimed at sabo-
tage, which is very similar to terrorism. During the
Cold War, BW agents were developed as large-
scale strategic weapons, making use of interconti-
nental missiles. Since the end of the Cold War,
views on how BW agents might be used have
changed. Missile attacks remain possible as more
states acquire long-range and cruise missiles.
However, now the whole spectrum from small,
directed, covert operations and bioterrorism to
larger-scale attacks has to be considered when
planning preparedness.
This paper has focused mainly on military BW
programs, and has not considered the history of
bioterrorism as such. Only since the end of the
Cold War has bioterrorism come into focus. There-
fore, its history is short. It is important to remem-
ber that warfare and bioterrorism using BW agents
can be the same thing.
History has shown that developments in bio-
technology will be used for military purposes.
As this development is very rapid and the tech-
nology is very powerful, the necessity for a multi-
lateral control mechanism cannot be ignored, nor
can the strong influence that scientists have had on
the development of BW agents and their role in-
fluencing the military.
Negotiations to establish the BTWC have gone
hand-in-hand with the development of BW agents,
and the process of strengthening the convention
has been very slow.
The BTWC was agreed only after deleting all
references to a verification and control regime, as
the Soviet Union would not accept this. Attempts
to promote transparency through information
exchange and confidence-building measures have
been of limited value, as many countries view
them as voluntary. The development of a compre-
hensive control regime for the BTWC, including
mandatory declarations, visits to confirm accuracy
in declarations, and the possibility of carrying out
challenge inspections (field or facility investiga-
tions), has been taking place since 1995. A pro-
posed final version of the control regime was
finalized in March 2001, but it was not acceptable
to the USA. Therefore, no final document was
produced at the BTWC Fifth Review Conference
in November 2001. The conference will be contin-
ued in November 2002.
It is now important to find a way forward. It is
probable that the proliferation of BW agents will
continue unless the BTWC is successful in estab-
lishing an enforceable control regime. The scien-
tific community and the biotechnological industry
are influential players who must also share re-
sponsibility in these matters.
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